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ABSTRACT
Can Americans who join terrorist organizations and fight against United States troops be
charged with treason? Does the January 6th riot in Washington D.C. constitute “levying war”?
Despite ongoing acts of levying war, and providing aid and comfort to enemies, the United
States has not had a treason conviction since the 1950’s. Courts and prosecutors actively avoid
the charge, leading to a substantial lack of case law and legal guidance. Today, legal scholars
disagree on how the Treason Clause should be applied. In this thesis, I discuss the disappearance
of treason, and analyze opposing views on how the treason charge should be utilized in the
twenty-first century. Specifically, I argue that treason holds significant constitutional importance,
and should return as a viable charge in criminal law.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
I.

STEP BY STEP GUIDE TO COMMITTING TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES ....... 3
a)

How to Levy War................................................................................................................. 3

b) How to Adhere to an Enemy, Providing Aid and Comfort.................................................. 4
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF TREASON.................................................................................. 6
a) The Inclusion of Treason in the Constitution and the Rational for It Being the Only Crime
Defined in The Constitution ........................................................................................................ 6
b) A Brief History of Treason in The United States ................................................................ 8
c)

Why Treason Has Fallen Out of Favor .............................................................................. 11
i.

The Problems with Cramer ............................................................................................ 12

ii.

Proxy Laws ..................................................................................................................... 15

iii. Military Jurisdiction........................................................................................................ 17
III.
a)

WHY TREASON SHOULD RETURN AS A VIABLE CHARGE ................................. 19
By Any Other Name .......................................................................................................... 19

b) Passions of Men ................................................................................................................. 20
c)

Punishments ....................................................................................................................... 21

d) Clarity in Modern Terms ................................................................................................... 22
IV. REESTABLISH THE TREASON CLAUSE AS A MEANINGFUL AND WORKABLE
CHARGE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM. ........................................................................................ 26
a)

Restricting Cramer............................................................................................................. 26

b) Expanding the Definition of “Enemies” to Include Modern Organizations and NonTraditional Enemies That Were Not Prevalent at the Inception of the Treason Clause ........... 27
V. APPLYING TREASON CHARGE....................................................................................... 31
a)

January 6th Insurrection at the United States Capitol ......................................................... 31

b) John Walker Lindh ............................................................................................................. 32
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 35
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 36

iii

INTRODUCTION
“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of
Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in
open Court.”1
John Walker Lindh joined the Taliban and took up arms against American troops.2 Eric
Snowden leaked classified federal information.3 Rioters led an insurrection on the capitol.4 All
have been called “traitors” and “treasonous” by the public, but none have resulted in a treason
charge, much less a conviction.5 The Treason Clause is the only constitutional issue that has not
been applied in the twenty-first century. Should treason return as a viable charge in American
law? If so, how should it be applied?
Perhaps the highest and most imperative charge in criminal law is treason.6 It holds the
unique position of being the only crime defined in the constitution.7 Yet despite its historical and
constitutional importance, treason has fallen out of favor; the last true case was tried in 1952.8
This is not due to a lack of treasonous acts since the 1950’s. Rather, courts have been actively
avoiding the charge. This has led to a lack of substantial case law and legal guidance. Scholars
1

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 54 (E.D. Va. 2002).
3
United States Obtains Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against Edward Snowden, Justice
News, The United States Department of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, Oct. 1, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-obtains-final-judgment-and-permanent-injunction-againstedward-snowden.
4
Capitol Violence, FBI, Jan. 8, 2021, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/capitol-violence.
5
E.g., Lois Beckett, Why Aren’t We Calling the Capitol Attack Treason?, The Guardian, Apr. 5, 2021,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/apr/05/the-capitol-attack-treason.
6
See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 22 (1945).
7
U.S. CONST. art. III, §3.
8
Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
2
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have also largely ignored the Treason Clause. The few who dive into the subject often note the
lack of attention paid to it by legal professionals. Today, courts and scholars either disregard the
charge entirely, or disagree on how it should be applied in the twenty-first century.9 In this paper
I argue why treason should return as a viable charge in criminal law and analyze how it should
be applied to modern issues.
Section I establishes a fundamental understanding of the Treason Clause and how to
commit treason. Section II describes why the founders chose to define treason in the
Constitution, rather than leave it to Congress. It also studies how treason has evolved over time
and analyzes why treason prosecutions have disappeared. Section III discusses treason’s
importance and argues why it should return as a charge in criminal law. Section IV gives
proscribed changes that will enable the treason charge to return as a viable and workable charge.
Section V applies the proscriptions to relevant cases and delineates how they should have
resulted.

9

E.g., Jennifer Malone, American Taliban Avoids Charge of Treason, Claims to be Victim of Coercion, 7
PUB. INT. LAW REP. 1, 17 (2002)
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1451&context=pilr.
2

I.

STEP BY STEP GUIDE TO COMMITTING TREASON IN THE
UNITED STATES

In the United States, there are two ways to commit treason: “levying war” and “adhering to
an enemy, providing them aid and comfort.”10 Either way, three elements must be proven to
sustain a treason conviction: allegiance, an “overt act”, and treasonous intention.11 The elements
are characterized differently between the two forms of treason. However, both require the “overt
act” be proven by the testimony of two witnesses or be confessed in open court.12
a) How to Levy War
To “levy war” the participants must first owe allegiance to the United States and revolt
against their own government.13 If an individual aids a foreign enemy to overthrow the United
States, then war has not been levied.14 However, if a group of American citizens or nationals
attempt to suppress the law by force or try to overthrow their own government, then war may be
levied.15
Second, is intent.16 In “levying war “cases, treasonous intentions are proven by a plan to
overthrow the government or to suppress the law by force.17 For example, planning to attack
congress for an unwanted law proves treasonous intentions.18 Attempting to overthrow congress

10

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
E.g., Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
12
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
13
United States v. Greathouse, 26 F. Cas. 18, 22 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1863).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
E.g., Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 930 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800).
17
Id.
18
Cf. U.S v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. 348 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (finding that targeting an excise office of the United
States to suppress the law is treason).
11
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by force is another example.19 However, a protest without the intent to suppress or overthrow is
not treason by “levying war.”20
Third, a treasonable design must be put into action. This is the “overt act” that must be
proven by two witnesses or confessed in open court.21 Conspiracy to overthrow the government
or to suppress the law by force does not amount to “levying war.”22 War is only levied when the
conspired plan is put into action.23 This can be characterized by the assemblage of men for a
treasonable design.24 However, if men are recruited to serve an individual, or to protest, then war
has not been levied.25
b) How to Adhere to an Enemy, Providing Aid and Comfort
To commit treason by “adhere to an enemy, providing aid and comfort”, the individual must
owe allegiance to the United States. Regardless of residency or dual citizenship, American
citizens and nationals owe allegiance to the United States.26 Because treason is a breach of
allegiance, those owing no loyalty to the United States cannot commit treason.27

19

Id.
Fries, 9 F. Cas. at 931.
21
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
22
E.g., Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. 75, 126 (1807).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 127.
25
Id.
26
Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717, 733-35(1952).
27
See id.
20
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Next is the “overt act.” Unlike “levying war”, this form of treason is not bridled by specific
deeds.28 Providing “aid and comfort” comes in many different forms. A few examples are
speech, harboring, holding money, providing information, and working behind enemy lines.29
Last is intention, or “adhering” to the enemy. The intention requirement protects unknowing
participants.30 For example, providing housing to an enemy, without the knowledge they are an
enemy, is not treason.31 Proving intentions also distinguishes free speech from treason in the
form of speech. For example, dissenting opinions are protected.32 However, if speech is created
with the intent to betray while aiding an enemy, then treason has been committed.33

Cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 58 (1945) (“Acts innocent on their face, when judged in the
light of their purpose and of related events, may turn out to be acts of aid and comfort committed with
treasonable purpose.”).
29
E.g., id.
30
See id. at 30.
31
See id. at 28.
32
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
33
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948).
28
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II.

THE RISE AND FALL OF TREASON

a) The Inclusion of Treason in the Constitution and the Rational for It Being the Only Crime
Defined in The Constitution
Treason holds the unique position of being the only crime defined in the Constitution. This
phenomenon can be attributed to England’s abuse of the crime.34 In English law during the
American Revolution, many deeds were considered treason: (1) encompassing the death of the
King, the Queen, or their heir; (2) violating the King’s companion, wife, eldest unmarried
daughter, or the eldest son’s wife; (3) levying war; (4) adhering to the King’s enemies, providing
them aid and comfort; (5) and slaying the Chancellor, Treasurer, or Judges.35 The wide variety of
treasonous acts dangerously exposed people to prosecution. Specifically, accusations of
“imaging the death of the King” were used to eliminate political rivals, or to suppress resistance
to the Crown.36 If treason were left to Congress, it could be changed easily to fit the wants of the
party in power and be utilized as a political weapon. However, by placing it in the Constitution,
the Founder’s set treason on a higher level than other laws and made it extremely difficult to
change. Because the Treason Clause is in the Constitution, amending it requires a two-thirds
majority vote, or a constitutional convention to be called with a two-thirds majority vote.37 It is

Cf., Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1945) (“The temper and attitude of the Convention
toward treason prosecutions is unmistakable. It adopted every limitation that the practice of governments
had evolved or that politico-legal philosophy to that time had advanced.”).
35
See Treason Act 1351, 25 Edw. 3 c. 2 § 5 (Eng.).
36
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: COLLECTED ESSAYS 5
(1971).
37
U.S. CONST. art. V.
34
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unlikely the Treason Clause will ever be amended through Congress; out of the 11,000
amendments proposed since 1789, only twenty-seven have been ratified.38
Also due to the abuse suffered in England, the Founders adopted a narrow definition of
the crime.39 Language such as “levying war” and “adhering to enemies, giving them aid and
comfort” were borrowed from English law.40 However, the narrow definition was not enough.
They also included a difficult evidentiary requirement, the “two witness” rule.41 Requiring the
testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act would protect against flagrant accusations and
ensure treason would not be used as a political weapon. Concerns were voiced at the
Constitutional Convention regarding the limiting nature of the Treason Clause.42 Some believed
the limited definition combine with the two-witness rule would make treason too difficult to
prove.43 However, the majority thought it best to err on the side of caution.44 The final Treason
Clause was decided as follows: “Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or
on Confession in open Court.”45

38

Amending the Constitution, U.S. Senate, 2019,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Constitution_vrd.htm#:~:text=It%20has%20b
ecome%20the%20landmark,11%2C000%20amendments%20proposed%20since%201789.
39
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 22.
40
Compare 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 5 (“. . . if a Man do levy War against our Lord the King in his Realm, or be
adherent to the King’s Enemies in his Realm, giving to them Aid and Comfort in the Realm. . .”) with
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. “).
41
MAX FERRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 346-48 (1911).
42
Id. at 345-50.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
7

b) A Brief History of Treason in The United States
The first wave of treasonous offenses addresses the issue of levying war. In 1795, John
Mitchell was found guilty of treason for his participation in the Whiskey Rebellion.46 Mitchell,
along with other armed insurgents, revolted against the region’s tax collector and burned his
house down.47 Because the intent of the revolt was to prevent the execution of an act of Congress
through force, and the insurgents showed a substantial show of force, acting in a military
manner, it was considered treason.48 Mitchell, along with other rioters, were found guilty and
sentenced to hang. A similar situation arose from Fries Rebellion in 1799-1800. Angered over
taxation, John Fries lead a large group of affected people to prevent the implementation of the
tax.49 Fries was subsequently charged with treason. At trial, the court emphasized the difference
between lesser crimes and treason is the intention behind the actions.50 Fries was found guilty
and sentenced to death.51
Two men were charged with treason for participating in Aaron Burrs military expedition to
Mexico in the case of Ex Parte Bollman.52 Allegedly, the true intention behind the expedition
was to levy war against the Unites States in New Orleans.53 However, the plan was never fully
realized. Consequently, the evidence was insufficient and the intention behind the defendant’s
participation was inconclusive.54 Chief Justice Marshall wrote: “To complete the crime of

46

U.S v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. 348, 356 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
Id. at 348.
48
Id. at 356.
49
Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800).
50
Id. at 930 (“The true criterion to determine whether acts committed are treason, or a less offence (as a
riot), is the quo animo, or the intention, with which the people did assemble.”)
51
Id. at 932.
52
Ex Parte Bollman and Ex Parte Swartwout, 8 U.S. 75 (1807).
53
Id. at 132.
54
Id. at 136.
47
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levying war against the United States, there must be an actual assemblage of men for the purpose
of executing a treasonable design.”55
The second and most prominent wave occurred in light of World War II. The most
notable case is Cramer v. United States, which reached the Supreme Court. Anthony Cramer was
a German born, naturalized United States citizen.56 In 1924, he was accused of treason by aiding
German spies.57 The spies entered the United States by submarine with plans to sabotage
American industry.58 Cramer met them multiple times and held $3,600 for them.59 He was found
guilty in the lower court, but the judge did not administer the maximum sentence stating: "I shall
not impose the maximum penalty of death. It does not appear that this defendant Cramer was
aware that Thiel and Kerling were in possession of explosives or other means for destroying
factories and property in the United States or planned to do that."60 This is where the controversy
began. In plain language, the Treason Clause only requires an overt act.61 While some courts
adopted this strict view, others contended mens rea was needed to find a person guilty of
treason.62 The Supreme Court decided extreme overt acts would show guilty intentions
themselves.63 However, in uncertain situations, such as Cramer’s, treasonous intent would need
to be proven.64 The ruling in this case proved to be controversial.

55

Id. at 126.
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
57
Id. at 3.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 3-4.
61
U.S. CONST. art. III, §3.
62
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 4 (1945).
63
Id. at 47.
64
Id.
56
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In contrast to Cramer, treason was rather obvious in Chandler v. United States.65
However, this case does demonstrate how the court treats propaganda related treason. Born and
raised in America, Douglas Chandler found political kinship with Nazi Germany.66 He moved to
Europe and worked as a radio broadcaster for the German Reich.67 The radio broadcasts were
used as psychological warfare to create division and problems among allies, and to demoralize
troops.68 The aim of the broadcasts was explicit to employees, including Chandler.69 In 1943,
Chandler was apprehended in Germany and returned to the United States where he was indicted
for treason, and found guilty.70 On appeal, the court made two important distinctions to the
Treason Clause. First, treason committed abroad is still within the jurisdiction of the United
States.71 Second, although mere words are not enough to constitute treason, speech produced to
betray while aiding an enemy is.72 This case demonstrates where free speech ends, and treason
begins.
The last true treason case was in 1952. Kawakita v. United States addressed the issues of
dual citizenship in relation to treason.73 Tomoya Kawakita was born in America and left for
Japan at age 17.74 While in Japan, Kawakita received formal education, and during WWII

Compare id. (finding the “overt act” was meeting with spies in a public space) with Chandler v. United
States, 171 F.2d 921, 925 (1st Cir. 1948) (finding the defendant was on the enemies payroll and clearly
understood his assignment was to create propaganda for the enemy).
66
Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 925 (1st Cir. 1948).
67
Id.
68
Id. at 926.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 927-29.
71
Id. at 929.
72
Id. at 944. (“Trafficking with the enemy, in whatever form, is wholly outside the shelter of the First
Amendment.”).
73
Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
74
Id.
65
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became a translator at Oeyama, a prisoner of war camp.75 The record shows that during his time
at the POW camp, he not only participated in, but also instigated, abuse of the POW’s.76 After
the war, Kawakita returned to America, where a former POW recognized him, and alerted the
authorities.77 The trial court found Kawakita guilty of treason for adhering to the enemy and
giving them aid and comfort by mistreating prisoners of war while employed in Japan.78
Kawakita lost the case and appealed. His primary defense was that as a dual citizen, he owed
allegiance to Japan while there.79 His defense failed in the Supreme Court and the ruling of the
lower court was affirmed.80 He was sentenced to death for his crimes.81 However, in 1953
President Eisenhower commuted the death sentence and gave him life imprisonment.82 Then, for
political purposes, President Kennedy and the Attorney Generals’ office reversed that decision,
and released Kawakita on the condition he return to Japan in 1963.83
c) Why Treason Has Fallen Out of Favor
The United States has not pursued a treason prosecution since the 1950’s. Similarly, the
Treason Clause has been largely ignored by law professors and legal scholars alike. The few who
delve into the clause often report the alarmingly sparse selection of relevant case law and legal
scholarship.84 But the disappearance of treason is not due to a lack of treasonous acts, nor is the

75

Id.
Id. at 726.
77
Id. at 721.
78
Id. at 743.
79
Id. at 735.
80
Id. at 745.
81
Id.
82
NAOKO SHIBUSAWA, TOMOYO KAWAKITA, Densho Encyclopedia
https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Tomoya_Kawakita/#top.
83
Id.
84
See Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 865-66 (2006) (“. . . there is virtually no scholarship engaging
76
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disappearance merely coincidental. Rather, the lack of treason charges after the 1950’s can be
explained by a few factors.
The following section covers the primary reason why treason has disappeared. First, the
ruling in Cramer v. United States made it nearly impossible to prove treason, and the Supreme
Court encouraged Congress to enact laws that would essentially usurp the Treason Clause.
Second, following Cramer, the legislature enacted laws to replace treason, which prosecutors
subsequently utilized. Third, post-9/11 policy hands enemy combatants who are American
citizens over to military jurisdiction, thus removing such cases from the traditional civil system.
i.

The Problems with Cramer

The majority based their decision to reverse on the intentions of the “overt acts.”85 They
ruled if treasonous intent is not obvious, then it must be proven that the acts were done with
treacherous intent, to further a treasonous plot.86 Furthermore, the Court found that only evidence
pertaining directly to the specific acts could aid in proving intentions.87 For example, the
following facts, admitted by Anthony Cramer at trial, were ruled impermissible to proving
treasonous intentions because they did not occur during the acts at issue and were not evident to
the witnesses (meeting, dining, and drinking with the spies): (a) Cramer knew one of the spies
well, Thiel, years before the incident, (b) knew Thiel had left the states to fight for the Nazi
party, (c) Cramer admitted he supposed Thiel and the other spy had illegally entered the country
through submarine, (d) Cramer held money for them, (e) Cramer admitted Kiel told him he was

doctrinal issues in American treason law.”); see also George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82
N.C. L. REV. 1611, 1612 (2004) (observing an alarming lack of attention to treason in American law).
85
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 35 (1945).
86
Id.
87
Id.
12

here on a mission for the German government, (f) Cramer actively helped to keep Thiel’s
identity hidden, and attempted to throw federal agents off of the spies tracks.88 The troublesome
aspects of this ruling are best highlighted in the dissent:
To say that we are precluded from considering those admissions in weighing
the sufficiency of the evidence of the true character and significance of the
overt acts is neither good sense nor good law. Such a result makes the way
easy for the traitor, does violence to the Constitution, and makes justice truly
blind.89
Dissenting Justice Douglas, with Chief Justice Stone, Justice Black and Justice Reed concurring,
found the ruling to be unreasonable and unprecedented: historically, there was no record to
indicate the acts themselves must function as evidence for intent.90 Furthermore, the majority
contradicted standard protocol for proving intentions in criminal law.91 Normally, people of
sound mind are assumed to understand the natural consequence of their actions.92 Therefore,
intent is usually evident from their actions or from their own admissions in open court.93 If
ambiguity exists, background information may be used as evidence to prove criminal
intentions.94 Without the ability to infer intent or to utilize the defendant’s admissions to prove
intent in treason prosecutions, Justice Douglas believed the charge would be unduly challenging
for the prosecution, and eventually lead to the release of traitors.95

88

Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 65-66.
90
Id. at 58-59 (arguing the Constitution does not require the two-witness rule be applied all evidence to
proving intent and finding no historical basis for the Majorities conclusion).
91
Id.
92
Cf., id. at 54-55 (arguing that people understanding the consequences of their actions is an established
staple in criminal law, particularly regarding treasonous intentions).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 60 (“The treasonable intent or purpose which it is said may be proved by a single witness or
circumstantial evidence must, in the absence of a confession of guilt in open court, be inferred from all
the facts and circumstances which surround and relate to the overt act.”)
95
Id. at 75.
89
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Scholars have taken similar issue with Cramer. The most in-depth analysis of Treason was
conducted by James Willard Hurst in 1971. Hurst believed the Court’s decision to be overly
narrow and unclear: “. . . The majority opinion in Cramer v. United States has cast such a net of
ambiguous limitations about the crime of ‘treason’ it is doubtful whether a careful prosecutor
will ever again charge an indictment under that head.”96 Hurst contends, similar to Justice
Douglas, no policy in English or American law supports the majority adding additional
requirements to prove intentions.97 Other scholars have attributed the lack of treason cases
directly to the Court’s decision. “. . . . I argue that a confluence of factors—namely Cramer,
Congress, and prosecutorial discretion—was responsible for the lack of treason prosecutions
after 1954.”98 The Court’s decision has caused a lack of supply and distinction on the topic of
treason, leaving future courts reliant on outdated case law with little guidance on modern
issues.99
Unfortunately, the issues with Cramer do not end with shackling the Treason Clause. In
Section V of the opinion, the majority notes treason is extremely restrictive, and encourages
alternate forms of prosecution.100 They indicate that Congress has the full power to create
alternatives to treason, such as crimes of disloyalty or forbidding acts that could endanger

96

HURST, supra note 36, at 217.
See Id.
98
Paul Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v. United States and Its
Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 635, 640 (2009).
99
See Larson, supra note 84, at 856-66 (“. . . there is virtually no scholarship engaging doctrinal issues in
American treason law.”); See also George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV.
1611, 1612 (2004) (observing an alarming lack of attention to treason in American law).
100
See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 45 (1945) (“But the power of Congress is in no way limited
to enact prohibitions of specified acts thought detrimental to our wartime safety. The loyal and the
disloyal alike may be forbidden to do acts which place our security in peril, and the trial thereof may be
focused upon defendant's specific intent to do those particular acts.”).
97

14

national security, particularly in times of war.101 This portion of the opinion was not addressed in
the dissent. However, Hurst mentions this section briefly, warning that straying from the original
intention to keep treason out of the legislature’s hands could cause strain in the balance of power,
and delete the safeguards embedded in the Constitution.102
ii.

Proxy Laws

But while treason is always disloyalty, disloyalty is not always treason. “Proxy laws” are
laws which punish disloyalty to the United States. Most actions committed in violation of these
could be tried under the Treason Charge. When the Supreme Court wrote:
The loyal and the disloyal alike may be forbidden to do acts which place our
security in peril, and the trial thereof may be focused upon defendant's specific
intent to do those particular acts52 thus eliminating the accusation of treachery
and of general intent to betray which have such passion-rousing potentialities.103
It gave prosecutors their blessing to try treason under lesser charges.104 When a possible treason
case arises, prosecutors have the discretion to pick which crime they will charge. Any reasonably
prosecutor would choose to charge a crime under the following laws and sidestep the strenuous
Treason Clause.
One such proxy law is the Espionage Act, which criminalizes acts that cause injury to the
United States or provide advantage to other nations, particularly regarding matters of national
security.105 The law applies to all other nations, parties, or military forces in foreign nations,

101

Id. at 939 (arguing that treasonous cases too difficult to prove under their decision in Cramer should be
tried under other offenses).
102
HURST, supra note 36, at 217-218.
103
Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45-46.
104
See id.
105
10 U.S.C.A. § 903a.
15

whether they are enemy or ally.106 Acts committed to benefit enemies of the United States could
fall under treason or espionage.107 Consequently, espionage is viewed as a lesser degree of
treason.108 However, the procedural requirements for espionage are not as strenuous as those for
treason.109
More recent proxy laws have been enacted in response to the War on Terror. 18 U.S.C. § 2
criminalizes activities that harm the interests of the United States, while 18 U.S.C. § 2339B
prohibits providing material support or financial assistance to enemy terrorist organizations.110
Similarly, 31 CFR § 595.204 prohibits Americans from providing or participating in transaction
that would provide support to designated terrorist organizations.111 Violation of these laws is
considered providing aid and comfort to enemies of the United States112 Such actions should be
subject to the Treason Clause. While other laws punish acts which jeopardize national security,
they do not punish betrayal and carry lower sentences than the Treason Clause.113 For example,
terrorist organization “Al-Qaeda” declared war against the United States in 1998.114 The
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organizations leader, Usama Bin Laden, publicly encouraged his follower to kill Americans, with
no regard to whether they are military or civilians.115 Since then, Al-Qaeda and organizations
under their umbrella have orchestrated various terrorist attacks against United States civilians
and military.116 Because they are an active enemy, if an American were to join or aid these
organizations, it would be a breach of allegiance. Therefore, any act committed, whether it be
providing monetary funds or fighting on the front lines, should be punished under the Treason
Clause. However, like espionage, it is far easier to acquire a guilty conviction under the
forementioned laws than under the Treason Clause. These proxy laws do not require the
testimony of two witnesses, nor do they require proof of intent. 117 Furthermore, these proxy laws
do not carry the stringent precedent from Cramer, only allowing evidence from the overt act
witnessed to prove intent.118
iii.

Military Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional issues have also contributed to the decline of treason prosecutions. In 2001,

Congress enacted law allowing the President to use military force against any nation or
participants he believed to be involved in the 9/11 terrorist attack.119 The law allowed enemy
combatants, even those who are American citizens, to be charged in military jurisdiction.120 This
raises three concerns. First, the law is problematic for case law and scholarship. Although
Americans joining terrorist organization to fight against their own is unpatriotic, their betrayal

115

Caruso, supra note 114.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9/11 Commission Report, 2004,
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf.
117
See 18 U.S.C. § 2; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; and 31 CFR § 595.204.
118
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 35 (1945).
119
See Authorization for Use of Military Force of 2001, PL 107–40, 115 Stat. 224.
120
See id.; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 508 (2004) (holding that U.S. citizens can be
detained as enemy combatants when there is sound factual basis).
116

17

does give the legal system the opportunity to apply archaic laws, such as treason, to modern
warfare. This would allow the Treason Clause to modernize, and provide legal guidance for the
future. Unfortunately, if these cases are tried under military jurisdiction, they do not apply as
precedent in non-military courts, leaving the Treason Clause to collect dust. The second issue
regards the Founder’s intentions. The Treason Clause was specifically written for situations
where those with allegiance to the United States decide to betray their country.121 There is no
indication the Constitution contemplates that citizens who are not part of the United States
military should be tried under military jurisdiction after committing acts of betrayal.122 Last,
despite any transgression against the country, American’s still retain Constitutional protections.
If tried as an “enemy combatant” those rights are relinquished.123
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III.

WHY TREASON SHOULD RETURN AS A VIABLE CHARGE

Treason plays a unique role in American law: the Treason Clause is the only law properly
equip to handle betrayal against the United States. When not utilized, betrayal goes unpunished.
The “passions of men” are not quelled. Case law and legal scholarship fail to develop, and the
public is left with little knowledge of what constitutes treason. This section argues why treason
should return as a viable charge in criminal law.
As there is no crime which can more excite and agitate the passions of men than
treason, no charge demands more from the tribunal before which it is made a
deliberate and temperate inquiry. Whether this inquiry be directed to the fact or to
the law, none can be more solemn, none more important to the citizen or to the
government; none can more affect the safety of both.124
a) By Any Other Name
Treason should not be charged under any lesser crime. The Founders set a high bar for
treason to prevent abuse, however, they never intended it to be so stringent that prosecutors
would avoid using it.125 Legal minds often emphasize the Founders’ intention to restrict
treason.126 In doing so, they omit why it was included in the Constitution at all.127 At the time,
under English law, treason was committed against the Monarchy.128 In a country with no
monarchy, whose politicians are voted in and out regularly, a treason law would not be
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reasonable unless allegiance is vital for a nation to thrive. Specifically, a treason law in the
United States would only make sense if loyalty to the Constitution is necessary for the nation to
function. This is evident from how treason is defined. To “levy war” against the United States is
to forgo the Constitutional process of changing law: protest, appeal, and voting for leaders who
will truly represent the people’s will.129 Likewise, to “adhere” and “give aid and comfort” to an
enemy, is to assist an enemy who means harm to the United States. Should the enemy succeed,
the liberties protected by the Constitution would be placed in jeopardy.
However, the Treason Clause does not punish action alone.130 Courts have repeatedly
emphasized that treasonous intent is necessary for a conviction.131 Actually, it is treachery and
action, rather than damage done that makes a traitor.132 The intention to betray separates treason
from other crimes. To commit treason is to betray the United States, the Constitution, and every
single American.133 While other crimes punish violence or the conveyance of national secrets,
the Treason Clause is the only law crafted to punish Americans who betray the United States.
b) Passions of Men
When treason arises, often a public outcry for justice follows. Considering there is “. . . no
crime which can more excite and agitate the passions of men than treason. . .”, prosecutors must
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be careful in utilizing the charge.134 The accusation alone brings unwanted stigma to the
defendant’s life.135 But, to not try treason under the proper heading may cause civil discord, and
lead citizens to serve their own means of justice. For example, had the POW who first found
Kawakita not been completely stunned upon seeing him in the states he “might have taken the
law into my own hands--and probably Kawakita’s neck.”136 Furthermore, the POW’s who were
the victims of Kawakita’s treason (and the primary witnesses in his trial) threatened to take
matters into their own hands if he were released.137 Similarly, when American Taliban fighter,
John Walker Lindh, was not charged for treason, there was fury among the public.138 Walker was
kept in strict custody. Had he been available to the public, Americans may have served their own
form of justice.
c) Punishments
One additional benefit of the treason charge is that, unlike the proxy laws or military tribunal
being used in its stead, treason carries a very flexible sentencing range. Those found guilty can
be sentenced to no less than five years, but up to capital punishment.139 For example, John
Mitchell in the Whiskey Rebellion and John Fries in Fries Rebellion, were both found guilty of
levying war, and sentenced to hang.140 Douglas Chandler, who created propaganda for the Third
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Reich, was given life imprisonment.141 Kawakita, who abused POW’s and was responsible for
the death of some Americans, was sentenced to death.142 On the other hand, before his Supreme
Court appeal, Anthony Cramer was only sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment for aiding
German saboteurs.143 The flexibility of punishment is one of the most advantageous and
overlooked aspects of the treason charge. Because Congress cannot create lesser degrees of
treason, it would be unreasonable for every individual found guilty to be sentenced to life
imprisonment or death. Especially because treason may be committee to varying degrees. If the
treason is egregious, life imprisonment or the death penalty may be appropriate. However, if the
treasonous act is of less impact, then fewer years can be assigned. This ensures treason does not
go unpunished but allows the court to decide how severe a punishment is needed.
d) Clarity in Modern Terms
Since the last treason case in 1952, war, international relations, and American society have
changed drastically.144 Nearly every constitutional issue has been applied to modern issues,
except treason.145 If a case arose today, courts would be looking to outdated caselaw for
guidance. The rise of terrorism and Americans who leave the United States to fight for the
enemy has compelled scholars to revisit the Treason Clause.146 But with little legal guidance on
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modern issues, scholars often disagree on what treason looks like in the twenty-first century.147
Similarly, the public has little understanding of what treason actually is.148 This results in
flagrant accusations which are harmful to those who have not committed any form of treason.149
The treason charge must return so that it may be established in modern terms.
Scholars have addressed the ambiguity surrounding the treason charge. First there is the
question of “levying war.” Should a domestic terrorist be tried under the Treason Clause?150 If
so, does it matter if they are a lone actor or part of an organization?151 On a similar note, if an
American joins ISIS and announces publicly that he is “waging war on America”, is he guilty of
levying war?152 The United States has only addressed “levying war” in cases resulting from an
increase of taxes in the 1800’s.153 While those cases may provide some guidance, there are no
cases that directly address the questions above.
Then, the law must consider the issue of “adhering to, providing aid and comfort to an
enemy.”154 Some argue the terrorist organizations are not an “enemy”, despite the American
military warring with such organizations for over two decades.155 Others argue an “enemy” is
someone engaged in hostile and militarized relations with the United States.156 Contrastingly,
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some believe a congressional declaration of war is necessary for someone to be an enemy.157
Next, is the argument that treasonous actions motivated by religious purposes would not fulfill
the “treacherous intentions” requirement.158 Conversely, there is the opinion that religious
intentions do not excuse traitorous actions. Again, most “aid and comfort” cases resulted from
WWII, so the questions of enemy, declarations of war, and possible religious exemptions have
not fully been addressed.
The public is also in need of clarification. Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Eric Snowden, and
the rioters at the January 6th insurrection have each been, at some point, accused of treason.159
While these accused are among the more notable in modern times, the terms “treason” and
“traitor” are thrown around brazenly.160 The problem with someone being deemed a “traitor”
without an indictment or trial, is that this label severely impacts people’s lives and how
Americans view public figures. Treason carries a stigma that once adopted, cannot be undone.161
Unfortunately, if legal scholars cannot agree on what treason is, how can the public begin to truly
understand it? The treason charge must be reconsidered and brought back so that when treason
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occurs, everyone can recognize it. And, when baseless accusations arise, people will not
automatically assume the accused is guilty.
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IV.

REESTABLISH THE TREASON CLAUSE AS A MEANINGFUL
AND WORKABLE CHARGE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM.

To reestablish the Treason Clause as a meaningful and workable charge in the legal system,
three things must occur. First, Cramer v. United States must be restrained. Second, foreign
terrorist organizations must be considered “enemies” as it applies to treason.
a) Restricting Cramer
To modernize the Treason Clause, the evidentiary requirements created in Cramer v. United
States must be curtailed. In its original form, the Treason Clause is stringent, requiring the
testimony of two witnesses to the same of overt act, and requiring intent or “adhering to the
enemy” be proven.162 Even some of the Founder’s believed it to be overly strict because
“Treason may sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficultas in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.”163 The decision in Cramer took proof from
“extremely difficult” to nearly impossible, except for when treasonous intent is obvious, such as
when an individual is on the enemy’s payroll.164 Today, Cramer would be the largest hurdle in
securing a treason conviction.165 For example, consider an American is caught meeting with an
enemy by two witnesses. The American is indicted for treason. During investigation, the
authorities find text messages, social media posts, and videos of the American, showing clear
support of the enemy. They also find a Cashapp transfer from the American to the Enemy with
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the caption “for the materials”, followed by a bomb emoji. They also discover the enemy
purchased explosives and planned to bomb Congress. Under Cramer, none of the above evidence
would be permissible to prove treasonous intent because they were not observed by either
witness during the “overt act” of meeting with the enemy.166 The intention requirement of the
Treason Clause would not be fulfilled, and the American would be set free. If Cramer is
overruled, prosecutors would be able to use evidence beyond the “overt act” to prove intentions.
b) Expanding the Definition of “Enemies” to Include Modern Organizations and NonTraditional Enemies That Were Not Prevalent at the Inception of the Treason Clause
The definition of enemies should be expanded to include modern organizations and nontraditional enemies that were not prevalent at the inception of the Constitution. To commit
treason by providing “aid and comfort”, the act must be done with adherence to an enemy.167
When Congress declares war, the enemy is obvious. However, the United States has only been
congressionally at war eleven times, the last time being in WWII.168 Most wars, or conflicts
which resulted in the death of American troops, were not conducted while being congressionally
at war. When war is not declared by Congress, who is the enemy? Is there an enemy? This is
arguably the most crucial point in bringing the charge of treason into the twenty-first century.
U.S. v. Frick held treason by “providing aid and comfort” only occurs when there is
war.169 However, it does not specify whether Congress must declare war for there to be a war or
an enemy. Indeed, it does not define what an enemy is in quasi-wars or conflicts (every “aid and
Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 34–35 (1945) (“Every act, movement, deed, and word of the
defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses.”).
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comfort” case has arisen out of formal wars).170 However, at the inception of the Treason Clause,
England, Spain, and France were all considered enemies, and Native Americans were “potential
enemies”, despite the United States not being congressionally “at war” with Spain, France, or the
Native Americans. 171 Likewise, in 1798 treason was applied to French citizens purchasing
supplies for their military bases.172 Further support is found in definitions. Black’s Law
Dictionary, defines enemies as “An opposing military force.” and “A foreign state in open
hostility to another whose position is being considered.”173 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a defines
“hostilities” as “any conflict subject to the laws of war.”174 Neither definition requires a
Congressional declaration of war.
Foreign terrorist organizations should be considered “enemies” as it applies to the
Treason Clause. First, organizations which pose a threat to the United States are enemies as
defined by technical and realistic application.175 Spain and France were considered “nation
security risks” and “enemies” for simply having land adjacent to the original thirteen states and
wanting to expand their reach from Europe.176 Under such reasoning, foreign militant groups that
have attacked, threatened, and killed Americans, would be considered enemies. Furthermore, no
congressional declaration of war is needed: only a foreign, opposing military force, that aims to
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threaten or harm the United States.177 While the charge of treason would be viable for any
foreign group that poses a national security threat, it is especially applicable when those
organization become firmly established and are actively fighting American troops. For example,
Al-Qaeda has been at war with the United States for years.178 They are responsible for various
attacks on military and civilian Americans, including the attacks of September 11, 2001.179 Then
came the Islamic State (ISIS). ISIS has held various territories in the Middle East but has a
global reach.180 They recruit, train, and bring terror to the world, aiming to destroy western
civilization, and calling for “death to America.”181 Likewise, the Taliban are known for their
violent, gruesome, and inhumane behavior.182 They also are responsible for the death of
Americans and have threatened the United States.183
Susan Babb contends that groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban are not enemies
under the Treason Clause because they are groups rebelling against their own governments.184
Her reasoning originates in U.S. v. Greathouse:
The term ‘enemies,’ as used in the second clause, according to its settled
meaning, at the time the constitution was adopted, applies only to the subjects of
a foreign power in a state of open hostility with us. It does not embrace rebels in
insurrection against their own government. An enemy is always the subject of a
foreign power who owes no allegiance to our government or country.185
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The ruling appears damaging to contrary arguments. However, Babb misses the most
relevant part of Greathouse: context. Greathouse is a Civil War case from 1863.186 The
defendants provided “aid and comfort” to other Americans under the guidance of Jefferson
Davis.187 The court ruled the defendant could not be charged with “aiding the enemy” because
the aid was provided to Americans in insurrection against their own government.188 To clarify,
before Greathouse, Confederates could be considered enemies.189 Post Greathouse, they were no
longer considered enemies, and could only be charged with “levying war.”190 However, “subjects
of a foreign power in open hostility with us” would apply to modern terrorist organizations.191
Under 10 U.S.C.A. § 948a, “enemy combatants” or “unprivileged enemy belligerents” are any
individual who: “(a) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners;
(b) has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners; or (c) was a part of Al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this chapter.”192
Therefore, under Greathouse and U.S.C. Title 10, the term “enemy” would apply to all members
of foreign terrorist organizations, such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban.193
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V.

APPLYING TREASON CHARGE

This section gives tangible examples of how the Treason Clause should be applied, given the
prescriptions made in the prior section. First, it discusses how the Treason Clause should apply
to January 6th insurrection at the United States Capitol was an act of “levying war.” Second, it
argues that John Walker Lindh should have been charged with treason.
a) January 6th Insurrection at the United States Capitol
If the evidentiary requirements in Cramer are restricted, the United States would be able to
prosecute some participants of the January 6th insurrection at the United States Capital for
treason by “levying war”.194 On January 6, 2021, Americans gathered at the United States
Capitol to protest the transfer of power to the newly elected President.195 Among the protesters
were extremists.196 Attempting to impose their will upon the government by force, they stormed
Capitol Hill, fought police officers, and brought violence to the Capitol.197 After the insurrection,
the FBI discovered some of the extremists had previously conspired online to storm the
Capitol.198 Under early precedent, the insurrection would have been considered treason by
“levying war”. 199 The extremists conspired a treasonous plot and held an assemblage of men for
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the purpose of carrying out a treasonous design. 200 The conspired plan would be utilized to prove
treasonous intentions and distinguish traitors from protesters who simply got caught in the riot.
201

Under Cramer, the previously conspired plan would be impermissible to prove intentions

because they did not occur during the “overt act” that was witnessed.202 However, if the
evidentiary requirement of Cramer is curtailed, the conspired plot would be utilized to prove
intentions, and treason could be proven.
b) John Walker Lindh
The case of John Walker Lindh (Walker) illustrates why treason must return as a viable and
workable charge. Born and raised American, Walker turned on his homeland and became a
Taliban fighter.203 He trained and fought with Al Qaeda and the Taliban against United States
and allied forces.204 He even met with Usama Bin Laden.205 Walker was found by American and
allied forces after a ground fight with the Taliban.206 Walker was brought back to the United
States, and charged with ten crimes.207 Among his charges were conspiracy to kill United States
nationals, providing material support and resources to foreign terrorist organization, contributing
services to Al Qaeda, supplying services to the Taliban, and using and carrying firearms and
destructive devices during crimes of violence.208 Yet, he was not charged with treason. Walker
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201
Id.
202
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received twenty years but was let out early, serving only seventeen.209 He was released in 2019
and is living freely in the United States; he is now in his early forties.210
If organizations like Al Qaeda and the Taliban are not considered enemies as it applies to the
Treason Clause, people like Walker cannot be tried for treason.211 Likewise, if the evidentiary
requirements in Cramer are not restrained, proving intentions would be very difficult.212
However, if foreign terrorist organizations were considered the enemy as it applies to the treason
clause, and the evidentiary requirements in Cramer were restrained, Walker would have been
charged with treason by “adhering to an enemy, providing aid and comfort.” Furthermore, he
would have been found guilty.
The outcome of Walker’s case is problematic. First, it does not punish his betrayal. Walker’s
actions were tried, but his traitorous intentions were not. His treason began when he left the
United States to join Al Qaeda. His treason was only furthered by him taking up arms with Al
Qaeda and the Taliban to kill Americans. Walker’s betrayal should be tried and punished under
the rightful charge of Treason. Second, Walker likely would have received harsher punishment
had be been tried under the Treason Clause. For creating propaganda, Chalder received life
imprisonment.213 Kawakita’s actions in the POW camp led to him receiving the death penalty.214
Walker’s actions were comparable, if not worse than any other individual convicted of treason.
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Yet, the Government allowed him to evade the possibility of life imprisonment or capitol
punishment. Last, the United States missed the opportunity to provide current case law and legal
guidance to the Treason Clause. This would have aided in future treason cases, and furthered
scholars and the public’s understanding of the Treason Clause.
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CONCLUSION
The Founders placed the most important and foundational laws in the Constitution.
Simply by its placement, the Treason Clause could be viewed as more imperative than other
laws. It is uniquely equipped to handle betrayal against the United States because it places
emphasis on the intent to betray and includes safeguards which prohibit it from being used as a
political weapon. In eliminating the treason charge, the courts, legislature, and prosecutors have
done a great disservice. As lesser crimes takes its place, the Treason Clause collects further
ambiguity. Prosecutors and courts do not utilize it. Legal scholars struggle to define exactly what
treason is. The public misunderstands what “treason” or a “traitor” is, leaving the media and
everything other than legal guidance to tell them what it is.
As the Walker case shows, treason itself is still alive and relevant. If Cramer is restricted,
and the definition of “enemies” is broadened as it applies to treason, the Treason Clause will
once again be able to serve its proper function. The United States will be able to punish traitors
accordingly, and call treason by its rightful name. Doing so quells the passions of men and
allows the jury to decide a fitting punishment. While the actions, enemies, and specifics may
differ from century to century, treason will always be treason. It cannot, nor should not be tried
under any lesser crime. The time has come for legal minds to bring treason into twenty-first
century. The treason charge must be revived.
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